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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ADVOCACY: THE CASE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
AGREEMENT ON LABOUR COOPERATION 
 




Economic integration facilitated by multilateral, regional and bilateral 
trade agreements over the past two decades has had a significant impact on 
the efforts of public interest lawyers everywhere.  In the North American 
context, economic integration has been accompanied by an upsurge in the 
number of precarious workers in all three NAFTA countries, creating a 
growing demand for advocacy.  At the same time, the North American 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) has emerged as an 
important new site for legal efforts on behalf of these workers.  While the 
NAALC’s significant limitations have hampered its effectiveness as an 
instrument of social change, its use over the past decade or more has 
facilitated the emergence of a more robust transnational community of 
labour advocates in North America.  Our study of the NAALC will 
suggest that we need to broaden current conceptions of public interest 
lawyering if we are to understand both the paradoxical potential of the 
institution, and the way it has been utilized by advocates in all three 
countries.  
 
The NAALC is notable in that it (along with the North American 
Agreement for Cooperation on the Environment-NAACE) is among only a 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law 
School.  Many thanks are owed to Research Assistants Paula Barrios and Robert Russo, 
who each conducted significant amounts of research, including fieldwork, in an earlier 
stage of this project, as well as to Scott Cummings and Louise Trubek for comments on 
an earlier draft of the paper.  The project was funded by a SSHRC Standard Research 
Grant. A SSHRC Small Research grant facilitated the final stages of the project.  Finally, 
we would like to extend both gratitude and respect to the lawyers who shared their 
valuable time and insights with us. 
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small handful of international institutions that expressly contemplate the 
participation of nongovernmental organizations.1  Both the NAACE and 
the NAALC provide adjudicative process open to both governments and 
nongovernmental groups for the investigation of complaints relating to 
failures of enforcement of environmental and labour standards in the 
NAFTA member states.2  Although the notion of non-state international 
associations participating in the creation and development of transnational 
norms is hardly new, it had long been confined to the informal 
realm.(Charnovitz, 2006)  While activities such as the submission of 
amicus briefs to international tribunals and the monitoring of state 
compliance with international obligations by NGO’s have become more 
common in recent years, these developments sit, sometimes uneasily, 
alongside traditional state-to-state mechanisms of international law.  This 
expanded but somewhat indeterminate role for transnational advocacy 
organizations is part of the context in which the developments that this 
paper seeks to assess have taken place. 
  
The NAALC (along with the NAACE—the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation) was drafted after most of the 
NAFTA text, largely as a vehicle for ensuring the passage of the NAFTA 
through the U.S. congress.3   The NAALC does not create transnational 
standards for labour law, but commits each member state to enforcing its 
own labour laws.  To this end, the NAALC sets out broad principles of 
labour protection that each member state pledges to promote (through its 
existing domestic labour law regime) and creates a set of institutions and 
procedures for facilitating the advancement of these principles including 
                                                 
1 Other examples include the NAACE, the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, the World Bank Inspection Panel, and the UN Human Rights Commission.  See 
Graubart, supra.  Also, Jonathan Fox, (2000) “The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons 
from the First Five Years”, 6 Global Governance 279.     
2 There are significant differences in the institutional structures created by the two 
agreements, leading some to observe that the NAACE goes farther along the path away 
from the traditional ‘Westphalian’ model of international law in two respects.  It creates 
an international public advisory committee to provide independent advice to the 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation Secretariat.  It also provides for citizen 
complaints to be filed with the CEC Secretariat directly, rather than with country offices 
as in the NAALC.  See Knox, 2004.        
3 For more detail on the initial assumptions regarding the agreement and details 
concerning its passage, see Robert G. Finbow, “The Limits of Regionalism: NAFTA’s 
Labour Accord” (Ashgate: 2007); also Dombois et. al. (2003).  




the gathering of information, the fostering of cross border dialogue and the 
investigation of incidents of noncompliance through a complaint 
mechanism.4   At the time of its passage, it was widely criticized by NGOs 
and labour unions for its limited reach, lack of enforceable standards, and 
procedural complexity.  Notwithstanding these profound limitations, the 
NAALC (along with the NAACE) does set up a ‘citizen-petition’ 
mechanism, whereby anyone can file a ‘complaint’ with one of the three 
National Administrative Offices (NAO) alleging that a member state is 
exhibiting a consistent pattern of violating its own labour, employment or 
health and safety laws.   
 
This paper seeks to examine the use of the NAALC by 
transnational labour law advocates as part of a larger set of interconnected 
transformations within international institutions and among progressive 
lawyers.  These two sets of developments; the emergence of new arenas 
for international advocacy and the creation of transnational advocacy 
networks, are so deeply interwoven that it is difficult, and indeed in our 
view, unhelpful to study them in isolation from one another.  Advocacy 
efforts may contribute to the creation or the expansion of a particular 
institutional arena, as in the submission of amicus curiae briefs to the 
WTO Appellate Body.5  In turn, an institution’s structure and processes 
can play a significant role in facilitating (or inhibiting) the creation of 
transnational networks around advocacy efforts, as our analysis of the 
NAALC will underscore.   
 
In order to fully explore both the arenas and networks aspects of 
NAALC related advocacy, as well as their inter-relations, this article has 
two main sections.  First, a theoretical context will be provided for both 
aspects of the analysis.  Our discussion of the NAALC as a new type of 
transnational legal institution takes place in a broader context of debates 
on the emergence and efficacy of ‘soft law’ in a diverse array of 
transnational contexts.  Our consideration of the transnational advocacy 
networks that have mobilized around the NAALC engages with a nascent 
                                                 
4 The main institutions created by the NAALC are a governing Council comprised of the 
labour ministers, a Secretariat of international civil servants with a general mandate to 
support the council, and the three national administrative offices (or NAO’s). 
5 Howse ref.  Also could reference IISD submissions in the Methanex case leading to the 
decision that Amicus Briefs may be considered by ch. 11 panels in the NAFTA case.    
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literature on the globalization of public interest lawyering (PIL) as well as 
more long standing debates on transnational advocacy networks (TANS). 
 
The second part of the article turns to an examination of the uses 
made of the NAALC by advocates.  Civil society actors play a vital role in 
the NAALC as they are the actors who identify and select the cases to be 
brought to National Administrative Offices, initiating the complaints 
process, that part of the institution around which most activity has 
circulated and which presents the greatest potential for fostering new 
forms of transnationalism.6  In this section, we first provide an overview 
of the use of the NAALC complaints process between 1994 and 2005.  
While the NAALC received a fair amount of scholarly attention early on 
and many of its first cases have been well documented, more recently, 
questions have been raised by some groups about the efficacy of the 
process.7  We then look more closely at two of the more recent complaints, 
the first involving a proposed set of labour law reforms in Mexico, filed in 
the US NAO, and the second involving the treatment of Mexican H2B 
(forestry) Visa workers in Idaho, filed in the Mexican NAO.  Our research 
is based on a review of secondary literature on the earlier NAALC cases, 
official documents filed with the National Administrative Offices, as well 
as interviews with lawyers involved in two of the most recent complaints.  
We are interested in documenting the advocacy networks developed in 
relation to each of these complaints, and in the reasons why these 
particular networks turned to the NAALC process, notwithstanding the 
disillusionment expressed by a number of organizations that had filed 
complaints over the previous decade.8  While the advocates we spoke with 
were under no illusions about the likely outcomes of the complaints 
process itself, they sought to utilize it as a part of a wider range of 
strategies for publicity and social mobilization around their issues of 
concern.  
  
                                                 
6 States may also initiate complaints but for reasons discussed below, they never have. 
  
7 Articles and reports that document the earlier cases include Human Rights Watch, 2001, 
Compa, 2001, Schurtman, 2005,  Graubart, 2005.  Questions concerning the efficacy are 
raised by Delp et. al. 
8 On the disillusionment of a variety of unions with the NAALC process, see Stephen 
Clarkson, North American Governance, chapter on “Transborder Labour 
Governance”(forthcoming).  See also Delp et. al, (2004). 




Our analysis will suggest that paradoxically, despite more than a 
decade of decidedly mixed results, it is too soon to dismiss the NAALC.  
Accounts that represent the NAALC as a ‘toothless’ and ineffective 
institution fail to grasp its hybrid role as a politicized mediator of social 
policy in the very unequal political economy of North America, that is, a 
‘‘legalized’ political opportunity structure’.9  In design as well as practice, 
the NAALC is a complex and paradoxical institution.  Although it 
contains both ‘soft’ (communication and cooperation) and ‘hard’ 
(committees of experts and sanctions) law features, state’s concerns 
regarding its potential negative implications for trading relations have 
effectively precluded recourse to the ‘harder’ aspects of the agreement.  
Additionally, while it relies on civil society actors to initiate its complaints 
mechanisms, it gives them no further role in dispute resolution, frequently 
leaving them in the dark as to the eventual outcome.  Notwithstanding 
ongoing frustrations with the process, however, complaints have continued 
to be filed in recent years (albeit at a slower pace).  In the context of 
daunting economic and political inequalities among the three countries and 
significant linguistic and professional barriers between lawyers, unions 
and activists, the NAALC continues to play a role in fostering a nascent 
labour transnationalism within North America, whose significance should 
not be discounted.10   
 
II. FRAMING THE ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONS AND 
NETWORKS 
  
As we suggest in our introduction, both aspects of the NAALC are 
equally relevant to an analysis of its import, both for the consideration of 
transnational public interest lawyering that is the subject of this special 
issue, as well as more generally for the future of North American labour 
policy.  They are also, in practice, deeply interdependent.  However, 
research on international institutions and transnational advocacy networks 
has for the most part proceeded along parallel tracks.  While one of the 
                                                 
9 Graubart, 2005. 
10 Finbow, for example, notes “NAALC has generated unprecedented transnational 
interaction and integration among labour advocates, analysts and bureaucracies, 
stimulated by cooperative activities, and the transnational character of the submissions 
process.” p.220.  
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aims (and potential contributions) of the current study is to move towards 
a more integrated analysis, we will begin by contextualizing each of these 
strands of analysis separately.  These separate inquiries will provide the 
groundwork for our more detailed and integrated analysis of two recent 
complaints in the final part of the paper.   
  
A. THE NAALC AS A HYBRID LEGAL INSTITUTION 
 
The NAALC creates a set of institutions intended to facilitate 
regional cooperation within North America on matters of labour law and 
policy.  It is governed by a council comprised of the Labour Ministers of 
the NAFTA signatories.  It also creates a Secretariat of international civil 
servants with a mandate to support the Council.  Each of the Labour 
Ministers is responsible for creating a National Administrative office in 
their respective territories.  In the NAALC, unlike the institutions created 
at the same time to govern North American Environmental Cooperation 
(the NAAEC), it is the National Administrative Offices (NAO) that 
administer the complaints process.  So, although the NAALC is comprised 
of both transnational and national elements, it has been the national 
offices, embedded within domestic bureaucratic structures and directly 
accountable to their governments, which have had the most influence in 
shaping NAALC’s particular hybrid and politicized institutional form.  
The transnational role of the Secretariat has been less significant, both by 
design and in practice.11   
 
The fact that the NAO’s are effectively part of domestic 
bureaucracies makes their functions subject to the larger political calculus 
of the governments in question, including concerns about how the 
handling of particular complaints may affect overall relations between the 
countries.  The political sensitivities of governments may also explain why 
information regarding complaints, or resulting Ministerial consultations, is 
not always readily available to the public.   Ongoing bureaucratic 
                                                 
11 The official website of the North American Commission for Labour Cooperation 
(www.naalc.org) states that “with the support of the Secretariat, the NAO’s initiate the 
cooperative activities of the Commission, including seminars, conferences, joint research 
projects, and technical assistance in relation to the eleven Labor Principles of the 
NAALC.” (last visited on 1/11/08).   




reorganizations and changes of personnel, especially in the U.S. and 
Mexican offices, may have also contributed to ongoing problems of 
accessibility and transparency.  Finally, the hybrid, politicized structure of 
the NAO’s almost certainly also explains why recourse has never been 
made to the ‘hard’ law aspects of the agreement, such as the Evaluation 
Committees of Experts, Arbitral Panels or sanctions, on issues where they 
are available.12         
 
The U.S. NAO is housed within the U.S. Department of Labour.  
The office has experienced a series of recent changes.  It changed its name 
to the Office of Trade Agreement Implementation (OTAI) in 2004, when 
the office was given further functions to include implementation of the 
labor chapters of bilateral and regional free trade agreements.13  The 
Director of this Office was also the Secretary of the National 
Administrative Office of the NAALC.  A further name change occurred on 
December 14, 2006, to the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA).  
This office maintained the designation of the NAO for the NAALC but 
was also given more functions in relation to other bilateral and regional 
free trade agreements (US-Australia, US- Chile, US- Morocco, US- 
Singapore, and US-Dominican Republic-Central America (CAFTA-DR).14  
This office combines the functions of the U.S. NAO and the Secretariat of 
the CLC, which means that complaints filed with other NAO’s must also 
be filed in Washington prior to being processed.  The reorganizations 
(which appear to be associated with significant reductions in funding) 
have dramatically affected the office’s ability to discharge its functions 
effectively, which according to advocates skeptical of the Bush 
administration’s commitment to labour rights, would have been their 
intended effect.  Even the theoretically more independent and international 
                                                 
12 See Dombois et al. (2003).  ECE’s may only be convened in relation to matters of 
occupational health and safety or other technical labour standards, not in relation to 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, or the right to strike.  
13 Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, Bureau of International Labor Affairs; 
Notice of Renaming the National Administrative Office as the Contact Point for Labor 
Provisions of Free Trade Agreements; and Request for Comments on Procedural 
Guidelines.  Federal Register / Vol. 69, No.246/ Thursday, December 23, 2004. 
14 Department of Labor, Office of the Secreatry, Bureau of International Labor Affairs; 
Notice of Reassignment of Functions of Office of Trade Agreement Implementation to 
Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; Notice of Procedural Guidelines, Federal Register 
Notice, Volume 71, No. 245, page 75591-76696, December 14, 2006.  
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Secretariat has become dramatically less effective under the Bush 
administration; its credibility marred by political scandal, delayed 
appointments, and significantly reduced funding levels.15        
 
The Mexican National Administrative Office functions in the Unit 
of International Affairs and reports directly to the Secretariat of Labour 
and Social Welfare.16  The current Director of the Secretariat is Jorge 
Rodriguez Castaneda, who was appointed on January 1 of 2007 by the 
current President.  Both the Director of the Secretariat and the director of 
the Unit do not have much job security, given the political nature of their 
positions.  Castaneda is a lawyer and has extensive experience in the area 
of telecommunications in bilateral negotiations with the US Department of 
State prior to his appointment. The employees of the NAO have been 
replaced with every change of government, but as of July of 2007 the 
changes had not been made, although they were expected at any time.17  
The Mexican office has also changed its structure over time.  For example, 
the operating manual for the office has been changed on the regular basis 
(1997, 1998, 2001, 2003, and 2005).18  These changes were aimed at 
organizing the committee of conciliators, the functions of the NAO and 
                                                 
15 A review of the website in July 2007 reveals that the most recent Annual Report filed 
on the website dates to 2002; no events have been reported for several years and there 
only appears to be one permanent staff person. The credibility of the Secretariat was also 
recently marred by the abrupt departure of its Executive Director, Mark Knouse, in 
October, 2006.  Mr. Knouse was appointed by U.S. Labour Secretary Elaine Chao to the 
post in 2004.  Mr. Knouse is the husband of Secretary Chao’s Executive Assistant and a 
former lobbyist.  His departure came amid allegations that he had continued his lobbying 
activities while working for the Commission, had appointed many friends and associates 
to positions in the Commission, and had filed numerous false or excessive expense 
reports.  “Allegations of Cronyism, Misdeeds, leave Labour Panel under a Cloud” Paul 
Singer, National Journal, October 31, 2006. 
    
16 Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social, Mexico, Estructura Organica at 
http://www.stps.gob.mx/transparencia07/estructuraorganica/organigrama general.htm  
Visited Mayo 14, 2007  
17 Telephone Interview with Patricia Juan Pineda, of the Frente Autentico del Trabajo 
(Labour Authentic Front).  July 13/07.  We can conclude, however, from the response 
issued by the office in October, 2007 to two complaints originally filed in 2005 indicate 
that the new appointments had been made.  
18Camara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Union, Manual de Organization General de 
la Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social. Diario Oficial Publicado, January 19, 2005.  
P 4-6.  




modifying the goals of the office and the Secretariat.  The Mexican office 
has fewer documents available online than either the U.S. or the Canadian 
office, and we found it somewhat difficult to obtain public documents 
relating to Complaint 2005-01.19  Indeed, although we were advised that 
an additional complaint had been filed in October, 2006, our searches 
revealed no record of it.20    
 
The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation is 
frequently dismissed by its critics because it both fails to establish a 
transnational regime of labour standards for North America and lacks an 
effective enforcement regime.  In our view, these types of critique aren’t 
helpful because they don’t recognize the potential utility of the ‘soft’ law 
aspects of the NAALC, nor do they acknowledge the complex balancing 
of political and legal mechanisms for the resolution of national and 
transnational issues of social policy that the NAALC represents.  
Substantively, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation 
does not seek to establish a transnational labour law for the continent of 
North America, nor does it set out any new labour rights or principles.  It 
does, however, identify eleven core labour principles already recognized 
by the laws of all three countries and it commits the signatories to 
effectively enforce those domestic labour law regimes.   
 
The NAALC also sets out a process for the adjudication of 
complaints arising from persistent or systematic failures of enforcement of 
domestic labour law.  The process has a laddered, three step structure, with 
not all issues eligible to be taken through all steps.  The first step involves 
Ministerial Consultations, invoked on the basis of an alleged consistent 
failure by one of the member-states to enforce its domestic labour laws 
(associated with any of the eleven labour principles identified in the 
                                                 
19 Although fieldwork for the larger study has also been completed in the Canadian NAO, 
for the purposes of this paper, we are confining our discussion to the U.S. and Mexican 
sites.  
20 Telephone Interview with Patricia Juan Pineda, July 13/07.   Ms. Pineda stated that she 
had been given no filing number and that later she was advised that the complaint may 
have been lost when it was sent on to the Secretariat in the U.S, as the U.S. office was in 
‘transition’.  This was a complaint relating to limitations on collective bargaining rights 
in the state of North Carolina.        
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agreement).21  A second step could be the convening of an Evaluation 
Committee of Experts (ECE).  This step may not be invoked, however, for 
complaints pertaining to freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike, arguably, the most fundamental (but also 
the most political) of the labour rights identified by the Agreement.  The 
final step would involve establishing an Arbitral Panel, which could have 
the capacity to levy trade sanctions.  This step could only be invoked in 
relation to three areas of labour rights: child labour, minimum wages or 
occupational injuries/illneses.  Not surprisingly, in our view, no 
government to date has sought to invoke the sanction process.                           
 
When the administration of these processes was being set up, it 
was determined that complaints may not be filed against a country in its 
home office.  While one might speculate as to the possible rationales for 
this administrative decision, it has had one very significant and 
unanticipated effect on the unions, social movements and other advocacy 
groups who have sought to use the complaints mechanism. (Kay, 
2006:16).  As a practical matter, this requirement means that the activist-
lawyers working on a complaint need to collaborate at least to some 
degree with lawyers or groups in another country.  As we will discuss 
below, the transnational advocacy networks that have been formed around 
the filing of various NAALC complaints have become one of the 
NAALC’s most notable achievements.  
  
In reviewing a citizen-petition, the NAO commissions legal 
studies, receives information from any interested party including the 
complained of government, then issues a report with its findings and 
recommendations.  There are no formalized procedures or set timetables 
for the submission process, which has been an issue for advocates who 
have sometimes found themselves required to respond to material 
submitted by companies or governments on short notice or not at all.  The 
most an NAO Report can do is to recommend follow up consultations 
between member governments.  The involvement of the petitioners usually 
                                                 
21 The identified labour principles are as follows: freedom of association and the right to 
organize, the right to bargain collectives, the right to strike, the prohibition of forced 
labour, labour protections for children and young persons, minimum employment 
standards, the elimination of employment discrimination, equal pay for women and men, 
the prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation in cases of 
occupational injuries and illnesses, and the protection of migrant workers.  




ends at this point, as there is no requirement that they be informed of the 
substance, timing or outcomes of Ministerial Consultations.  This is a well 
remarked upon source of frustration for petitioners who, having received a 
strong affirmation in a NAO Report, may then wait years without any 
information or further evident progress, while the complained of working 
conditions continue, or the impugned company closes the plant and 
relocates elsewhere. (Schurtman, 2005)  As we’ve already suggested, 
however, measuring the NAALC’s success or failure in terms of concrete 
measurable results in specific cases runs the risk of seriously under-
estimating its value.  
 
That is, as our review of its institutional framework has revealed, 
the NAALC was neither designed for nor intended to provide an 
enforceable North America-wide regime of labour standards, instead, it 
offers a hybridized mechanism that utilizes a number of ‘soft law’ 
processes that are likely to be more familiar to students of European social 
integration than North American labour lawyers. 22  In contrast to 
command and control style regulation with its binding enforcement 
mechanisms, the more flexible ‘soft law’ model incorporates such 
practices as the issuance of reports, consultations, monitoring, information 
exchange and expert reviews.  Scholars have argued that soft law is a 
distinct regulatory form, which operates in conjunction with more 
traditional regulatory models in a variety of ways. (Trubek and Trubek, 
2007).  Soft law mechanisms function differently from other forms of 
regulation, changing behavior of regulated actors indirectly, such as 
through exchanges of information and best practices, using persuasion and 
publicity (rather than sanctions) to encourage poorer performers to 
improve. 
 
Although the evidence suggests that NAALC complaints have 
rarely resulted in measurable changes to working conditions at particular 
worksites, the publicity that surrounds especially critical NAO reports, 
especially when combined with effective mobilization, can create political 
pressure for member state governments.  And labour and social movement 
advocates in North American have, for the most part, utilized this 
mechanism to strategically advance their own ends.  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
22 See generally Trubek and Trubek, 2007.  Also, Anna di Robilant, “Genealogies of  Soft 
Law” (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 499. 
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advocates continue to have questions concerning the efficacy and 
efficiency of the process.  In part, this is because more needs to be 
understood about the ways in which legal advocacy may couple with-- to 
facilitate or constrain --political campaigns in different countries.  Member 
governments are likely to be differently susceptible to such pressures, and 
their susceptibility may vary considerably over time as governments 
change.  It has been observed, most recently by Cynthia Estlund in an 
article on the ‘ossification of American labour law’, that United States 
legal institutions and decision-makers have been very resistant to the idea 
that international or in this case, regional norms might provide a model for 
domestic legal changes.23  This might be contrasted with the European 
context, where there is evidence to suggest (although it is still debated) 
that domestic labour regimes have been positively influenced from the 
regional level through the ‘soft law’ methods of the European 
Employment Strategy. (Trubek and Trubek, 2005)  Of course, there are 
many important differences between the highly developed and 
institutionalized form of economic and social integration in Europe and 
the truncated neo-liberal North American approach.  Moreover, in either 
context, the ‘success’ of soft law reforms can be notoriously difficult to 
assess.24  
 
Even so, it can be observed that the ‘soft law’ of the NAALC to 
date has had considerably less purchase (than the EES).  The lack of 
procedures for filing and response times, transparency, and reporting 
requirements, combined with the fact that NAO’s are embedded within 
national bureaucracies, has made it particularly susceptible to political 
pressures.  Complaints that are framed in potentially more transformative 
terms—that is, those which seek to gain rights for workers to enable them 
to become more powerful on their own terms, are particularly vulnerable.  
In recent years, the inhospitability of the Bush administration to labour 
rights has added another major obstacle for advocates in both countries 
seeking to use the NAALC, and use of the process has dropped off 
precipitously as a result.  Advocates with experience in the system have 
become disillusioned, suggesting that NAALC complaints may not be 
                                                 
23 Cynthia Estlund, (2002) “The Ossification of American Labour Law” Columbia Law 
Review 1589. 
24 Trubek and Trubek. 




worth the enormous amount of time and energy that they consume. 
(Schurtman; 2005; Delp, 2004; Graubart, 2005)25   
 
One key question addressed by the current research is why and 
how some advocates continue to find more than marginal utility in 
utilizing the NAALC complaints mechanism.  We suspect that both 
expectations regarding outcomes and styles of advocacy have to be 
adapted to the NAALC’s unique institutional form.  While for some 
advocates, persistent and profound power differentials and increasingly 
inhospitable domestic political contexts provide reasons to turn to other 
venues and/or projects, others continue to find ways to make use of the 
admittedly limited opportunities provided by the NAALC while working 
towards a more transformative model of transnational labour regulation, 
such as Rodriguez-Garavito’s “empowered participatory labour 
regulation” (EPLR) or Trubek and Compa’s ‘transnational labour law’ 
(TLL)?26   Our review of the use of the NAALC in the second part of this 
paper, and particularly, in relation to several of the more recent cases, will 
offer some insights into the ways in which advocates continue to 
strategically utilize the NAALC complaints mechanism.  Before turning to 
that discussion, however, we will provide some context for the networks 
aspect of our analysis.  
 
B. STUDYING TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR ADVOCACY NETWORKS 
IN NORTH AMERICA    
 
One well-documented consequence of the NAALC almost from its 
inception has been the facilitating role it has played in fostering 
transnational networking among unions and labour rights activists in the 
three countries (Compa; 2001,2005).  This is in sharp contrast to the 
situation prior to the NAALC, where there was distance and even distrust 
between unions in the U.S. and in Mexico. (Kay, 2006)  The 
                                                 
25 In contrast to the others, Graubart counsels a wait and see approach, suggesting that the 
‘political opportunity structure’ of the NAALC may become more potent when the 
political winds shift.  We are less sanguine about the possibility of meaningful political 
change in the short term, and so our emphasis in this paper is different.  We seek to ask 
what use advocates can make of the NAALC in difficult times such as these.      
26 Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005: 211; Trubek and Compa 2005: 223. 
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noteworthiness of this shift is evidenced by a considerable amount of 
useful scholarly attention that it has received.  Although there are a 
number of very good recent studies of North American union and NGO 
networking in the wake of NAFTA (Kay, 2006; Hertel, 2006; Graubart, 
2005; Anner and Evans, 2004), we are of the view that two lines of 
questioning might explored further.  Firstly, in the context of this special 
issue on the globalization of public interest lawyering, we are interested in 
addressing questions specific to the transnationalization of activist 
lawyering practices themselves (Cummings, 2007).  By lawyering 
practices, we mean questions such as how decisions to bring forward 
particular complaints are made, how evidence is gathered, how differences 
in language and legal systems are negotiated, how complaints are drafted 
and by whom, and how the legal complaints are coordinated with political 
struggles in several countries.  Another set of questions that we would add 
to these emerges from some of the more recent literature on transnational 
advocacy networks (TANS) which raises important concerns about the 
dynamics or ‘mechanisms’ operating within transnational networks, 
including questions concerning power differentials between differently 
situated ‘partners’. (Hertel, 2006; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; Ansley, 
2005)  
 
The question of translation is an important one to engage with 
when we are approaching the difficult questions involved in the 
mobilization of people across divides of nationality language, and culture.   
It is no less an issue in relation to public interest lawyering.  While there is 
no direct translation into Spanish of ‘public interest law’, there is a vibrant 
tradition of ‘alternative uses of law’, which is not exactly the same thing. 
(Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005, Borrero, 1995; Laso Prieto, 2007)     While 
‘public interest law’ has largely been understood in the US in terms of 
court based litigation strategies, ‘alternative uses of law’ embed legal 
critical activism within broader debate and political mobilizations.27  
                                                 
27 The notion of "Uso Alternativo del Derecho" was first introduced in Italy in 1972 in 
Criminological studies, from where it permeated the European Civil law countries, 
especially Spain, and from there to become an acknowledged approach in the Latin 
American legal systems.  This could be considered a neo-Marxist theory, as it intended to 
bring citizens closer to what had been considered the dominant and abstract legal 
institutions.  The alternative use of law is based on the idea that law is to be understood in 
relation with the political and economic system that surrounds it, rather than just an 
abstract system.  As such, law itself is a deemed as a political institution in the sense that 




However, along with the economic integration driven by NAFTA and 
other globalizing institutions, it may be that these two traditions are 
becoming somewhat less distinct. 
   
Cumming’s (2007) comprehensive analysis of the 
internationalization of U.S. public interest lawyering suggests that 
internationalization has significantly changed the landscape of advocacy, 
“altering the strategic value and applicability of different tactical options, 
multiplying the venues for legal engagement and creating possibilities for 
new professional alliances.”  The effect has been a shift in emphasis to 
‘multi-faceted advocacy over narrow legal representation”.  Law, though 
still important, is coming to be understood as an increasingly limited tool 
for social change.  This is a significant shift for most public interest 
lawyers in the U.S., where the focus, at least of the scholarly literatures on 
legal mobilization, has long been on the courts and the use of litigation by 
outsider groups seeking social change (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005; 
Scheingold and Sarat, 2004).28  Cumming observes that global 
interdependence has expanded “the scale of advocacy in ways that 
challenge the traditional conception, narrowing routes of legal redress 
while simultaneously expanding opportunities for new political 
collaborations and strategic approaches.”(p. 81)  He identifies shifts in 
three key areas; the goals public interest lawyers pursue, the tactics they 
deploy and the professional roles they assume.  Our research on the 
NAALC provides some evidence for each of these shifts on the part of 
public interest lawyers in the U.S., incorporating some insights into the 
role of ‘alternative uses of law’ in these transformations.  Overall, in the 
NAALC context, our study (along with several others) documents the 
emergence of a highly politicized style of advocacy, one that is 
                                                                                                                         
it allows for political transformations, but the duty to make those transformations happen 
is given primarily to lawyers, or in any case, to those "operating" or dealing with law -
whether by interpreting, enforcing it or adjudicating particular cases and also to citizens 
who are the ultimate addressees of the law.  
 
28 As Cummings puts it “Public interest lawyers, of course, have long viewed legal rights 
as supportive of-rather than oppositional to-political mobilization.  Indeed, the classical 
objective of public interest law is framed in terms of remedying the deficiencies of 
majoritarian democracy by opening political institutions to participation by 
underrepresented social groups.” (p. 82) But, one must not overlook the existence within 
the U.S. of a critical tradition, which has long warned against the overestimating the 
power of law to effect social change.  See Lobel,   
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collaborative, engaged and embedded in the ongoing struggles of social 
movements.29  
 
Both an ‘institutional’ and a ‘network’ dynamic seem to be at work 
in this shift.  Firstly, advocates from both countries are well aware of the 
large role that diplomacy plays in the decision-making in the NAO’s, with 
offices in each state being careful not to place too many demands on other 
governments, as a preventive (and defensive) measure in case of future 
complaints that may cause them difficulties.  In this way, the NAALC is 
typical of many such transnational fora, where politics and law intersect in 
complex ways.30  Rather than looking for specific legal outcomes, 
advocates turn to the NAALC in order to bring to light and to denounce 
systemic violations that have been ignored by governments.   Secondly, as 
these lawyers work together on drafting complaints, discussing strategies 
and coordinating their efforts with social movements and unions on both 
sides of the border, they are learning from each other, not only about the 
law or the subject of the complaint, but also about lawyering practices, and 
advocacy more generally.   So, at the same time as lawyers are using the 
NAALC as a vehicle to focus public attention on the need for a new 
dialogue between workers, advocates, grassroots groups and institutions, 
they are themselves beginning to engage in it.  
 
These lawyering networks also seem to fall within what Keck and 
Sikkink’s pioneering work (1998) identified as ‘transational advocacy 
networks’.  The wealth of scholarship that has recently examined 
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANS) has documented the ways in 
which local advocacy efforts in developing countries can gain profile, 
publicity and political purchase through connecting to broader 
transnational networks; what Keck and Sikkink call the ‘boomerang’ 
pattern of influence.  Certainly, some of this is going on in the NAALC 
context.  However, much of the early research on TANs focused on human 
rights (civil and political) and environmental advocacy, and may have 
                                                 
29 See also Graubart,  
30 It is important to note Rodriguez-Garavito’s caution, however, against a narrative that 
represents ‘soft law’ as a replacement for hard law, or locates it in a ‘paradigm shift’ from 
‘regulation to governance.’  As he observed in the context of the struggle over corporate 
codes of conduct and the monitoring of labour standards in the apparel industry, “the 
hardness of international labour standards is in and of itself a key object of contention 
between TNC’s and their critics”.  2005a, p. 77.     




glossed over some of the challenges and difficulties of these networks. 
(Riles, 2007)        
 
As Fran Ansley reminds us, building cross border alliances is never 
easy.31  It is important to be attentive to questions of differences arising 
among differently situated workers, social movements and advocates.  
Recently, as some scholars have begun to build bridges between research 
on transnational advocacy networks (TANS) and social and economic 
rights, we have begun to see more nuanced accounts of the conflicts and 
power dynamics within these networks.  In the North American labour 
context, several established international human rights organizations, 
including Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for 
Human Rights, have been involved in investigations and campaigns 
against labour rights violations in Mexico. (IFHR, 2006; Human Rights 
Watch, 2001)  However, international rights organizations and local 
grassroots groups may not always see the issues involved in a particular 
campaign in exactly the same light, as Hertel (2006) has documented.  Her 
account revealed the mechanisms by which local activists worked within 
but also contested the campaign mounted by Human Rights Watch against 
pregnancy testing in the maquiladoras.  While HRW consistently framed 
the issues in terms of ‘discrimination,’ local activists saw the issues as 
relating more broadly to social justice questions in the maquiladoras.  
Rodriguez-Garavito’s study of transnational anti-sweatshop campaigns 
and the effectiveness of various third party monitoring schemes also 
reveals the importance of attending to the ways that power asymmetries in 
NGO networks may derail the transformative potential of advocacy.   
 
III. PUTTING THE NAALC TO WORK:  LEGAL 
ADVOCACY AND LABOUR TRANSNATIONALISM 
 
                                                 
31 Ansley 2005 p. 170-171 He argues that the differentials in social and economic 
conditions between the collaborators from the North and the South make it difficult  for 
those groups of the North to “move toward genuine peer-to-peer alliances” with their 
counterparts from the South.   
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We now turn to a closer examination of the use of the NAALC by 
labour advocates.32   That examination has three components: an overview 
and analysis of NAALC complaints, a more detailed account of two recent 
complaints and a summary of our findings. The overview allowed us to 
identify a number of salient issues arising from the dynamic interaction of 
the institutions of the NAALC and the evolving advocacy networks that 
have sought to utilize the NAALC processes which we were then able to 
probe more deeply in our investigation of the two recent cases.   
    
A. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE NAALC COMPLAINTS 
PROCESS   
     
Although it was criticized from the outset by labour leaders for 
creating lengthy and complex procedures that lack enforceability33, the 
NAALC’s complaints process has been relatively well used since its 
inception in 1994.  We will argue that the formal complaints process, 
although not without serious limitations, needs to be understood as 
embedded within a complex and ongoing series of formal and informal 
communications between governments, the public, unions, workers, and 
advocacy organizations in all three countries.  With the exception of the 
year 2002, complaints have been filed each year from 1994 to 2006, 
amounting to thirty-five complaints in total.  As some had predicted, the 
Mexican state has become the main target of NAALC complaints.  Twenty 
two have been filed against Mexico, followed by eleven against the US 
and just two against Canada.34  In our overview of the thirty five 
                                                 
32 In this analysis, we are focusing on complaints filed in the U.S. and Mexican NAO’s. 
While research has been done in the Canadian NAO for the larger study, we have not 
included it here.   
33 See for example Tom Barry et al, (1994) The Great Divide: The Challenge of U.S-
Mexico Relations in the 1990’s 323-26. 
34 Thirty-five submissions were filed under the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC) between 1994 and 2006.  Twenty one were filed with the U.S. 
National Office, nineteen of which involved allegations against Mexico, while the two 
remaining involved allegations against Canada.  Nine submissions were filed with the 
Mexican NAO, all of which contained claims against the US.  Five submissions were 
filed with the Canadian NAO, three of which include allegations against Mexico and two 
against the US.  Of the submissions filed to date with the U.S. NAO, four (940004, 9602, 




complaints, however, we noted significant shifts over time in a number of 
areas: the frequency of use, the nature of complaints filed, the actors 
involved, and the response of the NAO’s.  Because of the relative 
underutilization of the Canadian office, we have focused our analysis 
primarily on complaints filed in Mexico and the US.    
 
In terms of the frequency of the use of the complaints process, we 
identified three moments in the history of NAALC: rise, peak and decline.  
The rise occurred during the first four years of its existence, when 
advocates, still exploring the mechanism, filed between one to four 
complaints a year and preferred the US National Office for processing the 
complaints - eight complaints were filed with the US office, and one was 
filed with the Mexican equivalent.35  The peak happened in the year 1998 
during which advocates became more aggressive and explored 
possibilities in the three National Offices with the filing of ten complaints 
–four with the US NAO, four with the Mexican NAO and two with the 
Canadian office.  A decline in the filing of complaints began in 1999.  
Since that time, only eight complaints have been filed with the US NAO, 
four have been with the Mexican NAO and three with the Canadian 
office.36   
 
                                                                                                                         
9803, and 2004-01) were withdrawn by the submitters before hearings were held or the 
review process completed. Hearings were held on ten (940001, 940002, 940003, 9601, 
9701, 9702, 9703, 9901, 2000-01, 2003-01). Eight of the U.S. submissions (940003, 
9601, 9701, 9702, 9703, 9901, 2000-01, 2003-01) have gone to ministerial-level 
consultations. The U.S. NAO declined to accept submissions 9801, 9802, 9804, 2001-01, 
and 2005-01 for review. Eight were filed with the Mexican NAO and involved 
allegations against the United States.  Mexican NAO submissions 9501, 9801, 9802, 
9803, 9804 resulted in ministerial consultations.  Four submissions have been filed in 
Canada, two raising allegations against Mexico and two raising allegations against the 
United States.  Canadian NAO submission CAN 98-1 resulted in 
35 Seven, out of eight complaints challenged the Mexican government, but the complaints 
were led by US-based submitters.  The complaints  US 940001, US 940002 (Honeywell 
&General Electric), US 940003 (Sony), US 940004 (General Electric), US 9601 
(SUTSP), US 9602 (Maxi-Switch), US 9701 (Gender Discrimination), US 9702 (Han 
Young), US 9703 (Itapsa), and MEX 9501 (Sprint). 
36 While in 1998 10 complaints were filed with the various offices, 2 were in 1999, 1 in 
2000, 2 in 2001, 3 in 2003, 1 in 2004, 5 in 2005 (3 with the US, 1 with Mexican, and 1 
with Canadian) and 1 in 2006 (with the Mexican Office).   
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Looking at the substantive issues raised by the complaints is 
essential to understanding both the institutional response and the 
transformative potential of the NAALC mechanism.  In the identification 
of those substantive claims, one is to be reminded of the distinction 
presented by Professor Rodriguez-Garavito (2005:205) between what the 
calls ‘protective’ and ‘enabling’ rights.  The narrower claims, which have 
more overlap with conventional civil and political rights, correspond with 
the ‘protective’ category, while ‘enabling’ rights are those relating to 
collective bargaining, freedom of association and the rights to strike.  The 
latter, according to Rodriguez-Garavito, are potentially more 
transformative because they facilitate workers power to continue to 
participate in their own struggles.  The majority of the complaints, twenty-
five,  invoke this latter category, and they have played a most significant 
role in shaping both the role of advocates and the institutions response 
during the history of the NAALC.37   
 
Among the complaints involving freedom of association, we found 
that, perhaps for strategic reasons, advocates did not always frame the 
claims in the same way. Twelve of these complaints sought protection of 
that collective right as a unique claim (US 940001, US 94002, US 940003, 
US 94004, MEX 9501, MEX 9601, US 9602, US 9803, US 9804, CAN 
9901, US 2005-02,  and CAN 2005-01), while the other thirteen included 
the protection of freedom of association as a claim connected to rights 
such as to occupational health, non-gender based discrimination, minimal 
employment standards, child labor prevention or collective bargaining (US 
9702, US 9703, CAN 9801, MEX 9801, MEX 9802, US 9901, US 2001-
01, MEX 2003-01, US 2003-01, CAN 2003-0, US 2005-01 and US 2005-
03) and strike (US 9801, US 2005-01 and US 2005-03).  We found that 
the presence of collective rights claims became an indicator of the 
institutional response to particular complaints.  Those complaints which 
solely addressed freedom of association did not travel very far, while those 
solely involving social or economic rights had a better chance to advance 
                                                 
37 The remaining nine complaints were proposed in isolation from collective rights’ 
protection.  In those submissions, advocates sought protection of various fundamental, 
civil and economic rights including minimal employment standards (CAN 9802, MEX 
9804, MEX 2005-01, MEX 2006-01), restriction on child labor (US 9802), protection of 
migrant workers (US 2005-01), occupational health (MEX 2001-01, US 200401), and 
eradication of discrimination in the work place (US 9701).        
 




several steps in the process and those with mixed claims were sometimes 
advanced, but solely with respect to the civil, social or economic rights-
related claims.   
  
In its initial few years, labour advocates saw the NAALC as a 
vehicle for highlighting the suppression of independent unions in Mexico 
and the poor conditions in maquiladoras owned by US firms.  Indeed, 
during the first year of NAALC (1994) four complaints were filed with the 
US National Office against the Mexican state, alleging violations to 
freedom of association.  The first two cases, known as Honeywell and 
General Electric (2 complaints) focused on disputes over organizing drives 
in Mexican factories that predated the NAALC’s existence.38  This trend 
continued during the two subsequent years.39  As expected, these 
complaints generally did not advance institutionally as expected by labour 
advocates.  Although the earliest two complaints were accepted for 
review, the public report stated that Mexico had not failed to enforce its 
own relevant laws.  Two of the subsequent complaints (US 9404 and US 
9602) were withdrawn by the submitters before the review of the claim, as 
the issues raised in the complaint were resolved during the process.  And 
the other three claims reached ministerial consultation, which ended in 
commitments among the three National Administrative Offices to 
implement educational activities involving public seminars, forums, 
conferences, expert’s reports, meetings and exchange of information 
regarding national legislation. 
  
            In cases filed during the middle period, increasingly sophisticated 
and networked groups of advocates focused the complaints on 
occupational health, discrimination and safety claims, as the NAALC 
contemplated the possibility that these types of claims could be taken 
beyond Ministerial consultations.  As these submissions involved more 
discrete ‘protective’ rights and the institutional response was more 
welcoming.  That was the case of submissions US 97-01, 97-02, 97-03, 
CAN 98-1, CAN 98-2, MEX 9801, 9802, US9901, US 2000-01, MEX 
                                                 
38 These two complaints are also known as US 940001 and US 940002. 
39 In 1995, a complaint was filed with the Mexican office against the US state alleging 
violation of freedom of association (MEX  9501 or Sprint), and in 1996 two cases were 
filed with the US office against Mexico (US 9601 and US 9602).   During the three early 
years, seven complaints regarding freedom of association were filed with the US and 
Mexican National Administrative Offices. 
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2001-1, 2003-01 (ongoing) and 2005-03 (awaiting report).  Ministerial 
consultations were held in these cases and they led to compromises in 
terms of educational programs on occupational health, safety in the work 
place, environment, migrant worker’s rights and exchange of information 
among the three offices.  In the CAN 98-01 case, the issues raised in the 
submission were resolved following the assistance and participation of a 
government team of experts on safety, health and labor environment.  Also 
notable is the use of experts in the resolution process, which contrasts with 
the more informal negotiated approaches associated with collective rights 
claims.   
  
More recently, the submissions have related to what we might 
describe as structural deficiencies in labour market governance.  
Particularly in the US and Mexico, advocates have begun to demand 
interpretation of local laws through the lens of international labor 
standards, and have raised questions of public policy and even challenged 
proposed law reforms.  This approach attempts to broaden the scope of the 
NAALC, which as observed earlier, is meant to only promote the 
enforcement of domestic laws.  Several recent cases have related to the 
failures of the US to extend its labor laws to migrant workers from other 
countries, particularly Mexico.  Parallel to this turn in the action of 
advocates, the institutional response has slowed notably.   
 
Cases that illustrate this turn notably include the MEX submission 
9802 (Apple Growers) which highlighted the difficult circumstances of 
migrant workers working seasonally as apple pickers in Washington State.  
The Apple Growers case involved a very broad coalition of advocates with 
considerable experience in NAALC cases.40  Other illustrative cases 
include MEX submission 2003-01 (North Carolina or H-2A Visa 
Program) seeking protection of collective rights, health and safety, 
minimal labor standards, discrimination and protection of migrant 
workers; US 2005-01 (Labor Law Reform) which sought to stop the 
approval of a Labor Law Reform in Mexico under the argument that the 
government bill was intended to codify systemic violation of collective 
rights including freedom of association, collective bargaining and strike 
and also social and political rights; US 2005-02 (Mexican Pilots-ASPA) 
which sought protection of collective rights of pilots by arguing that the 
                                                 
40 The Apple Growers case has been usefully discussed in Compa, 2001.   




Mexican government failed to enforce its own laws in accordance with 
international labor conventions, the national constitution, and the 
principles of the NAALC; US 2005-03 (Hidalgo), which alleged violations 
of collective and individual rights of workers of the textile industry by the 
Mexican government, alleging that the government failed to enforce its 
law with respect to equitable and transparent labor tribunal proceedings; 
MEX 2005-01 (H-2B Visa Workers) related to the precarious situation of 
migrant workers in Idaho, and the MEX 2006-01 (State of North Carolina) 
which sought protection for the collective bargaining rights of government 
employees in the state of North Carolina under the argument that the state 
failed to follow International Conventions, the NAALC, and principles of 
international law.41    
  
In contrast with the relatively prompt and active institutional 
responses observed in the earliest stage of the NAALC, in all recent 
submissions the institutional response has been slow and convoluted.  In 
these cases, the National Offices took somewhere between five months to 
over fifteen months to accept or reject the review of the claims –as in the 
H-2B visa workers’ case- and between fifteen months to two years to 
produce a final action or at least a final agreement or compromise between 
governments.  In some of the cases there was no final decision even after 
several years.  Timing is not the only concern.  Although transparency is a 
principle affirmed by the NAALC text, the NAO’s are failing to keep the 
complainants apprised of their processes and are refusing to release 
information to the public, including final decisions and compromises of 
the signatories.  In submission MEX 2006-01 against the State of North 
Carolina, for instance, the complaint was in fact lost.  According to one of 
the lawyers involved in the case, the complaint was filed with the Mexican 
office in October of 2006, but ten months later, it was not possible to 
obtain any information about the submission.42 Another example is that of 
the submission on the Labour Law Reform.  Despite the fact that the 
decision declining the review of the submission was issued on January 21 
                                                 
41 While most of the submissions are available online in the NAALC’s information 
system, this latest is not even mentioned.  We, however, obtained a copy of it from the 
team of submitters.  According to Patricia Juan Pineda, this last complaint went lost in the 
Mexico office at least until July of 2007.  
42 Interview with Patricia Juan, July, 2007. 
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of 2006, it has not yet been released to the public.43  And, finally in terms 
of outcomes, seen in the context of the NAALC’s objectives, this era has 
been the most disappointing.  Either there has been no response, as in the 
North Carolina complaint,  the NAO has declined to review issues focused 
on collective rights (cases of ASPA, Mexican Law Reform) or where the 
case has been accepted for review, determinations are unduly delayed 
(Hidalgo and H-2B Visa Workers).   
 
The final element we were able to assess in our overview is the 
number of named complainants.  While the qualitative aspects of the 
networking process were of greatest interest to us and will be discussed 
below, it was possible to observe a quantitative shift in networking activity 
through the increase of numbers of listed complainants over time.  In the 
first year the complaints exhibited just one, one, one and five submitters 
and between 1993 and 1999 the complaints had between one and five (one 
just one occasion) submitters. However, the practice of involving wider 
networks of groups appeared to take off around 2000.  One particularly 
well coordinated effort that year involved twenty three organizations 
(Auto Trim/Custom Trim).44  More recently, in 2005, one complaint was 
signed by 23 submitters (Mexican Law Reform), another one was co-
signed by 12 (H-2B Visa Workers) organizations and in 2006 the only 
complaint was submitted by 55 organizations (State of North Carolina 
Employees).  Further, the listed complainants and participants in the 
preparation and process not only include lawyers and organizations from 
the three NAFTA countries, but also unions and human rights 
organizations from other latitudes including Asia and Europe (Mexican 
Law reform and North Carolina Employees).  How the various groups and 
organizations work with each other within these networks, and what role 
the practice of widening the ‘net’ in relation to given complaints plays in 
the overall strategy of the advocates, are questions that remain to be 
considered in more detail in relation to particular complaints.  We will 
now turn to that discussion.    
 
                                                 
43 In this case, following a formal request to the US NAO, we obtained a copy of the 
decision for the purpose of this research. 
44 Cummings (2006) notes that this well organized effort was led by the Coalition for 
Justice in the Maquiladoras, in collaboration with lawyers and law students at the 
International Human Rights Clinic at St. Mary’s Law School (San Antonio) and the 
Columbia Law School International Human Rights Clinic. p. 84.      




B. ADAPTIVE LAWYERING STRATEGIES IN CHALLENGING 
CIRCUMSTANCES: TWO RECENT CASES   
1. U.S. NAO 2005-01  MEXICAN LABOUR LAW REFORM  
 
This submission was filed by an attorney at the Washington Office on 
Latin America (WOLA)45 on behalf of a network of twenty-two labor 
unions from Mexico, Canada and the United States.  This submission was 
filed on February 17, 2005, but its review was declined by the US National 
Office on February 21, 2006.  However, by the date the US NAO declined 
to review this complaint, the Mexican government had dropped the bill 
from Congress.  
 
The submission challenged the Mexican government for having 
proposed to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies a Labor Law Reform, so-
called “the Abascal Project,” that would allegedly violate the “central 
obligations of the NAALC, namely to ‘provide high labor standards’ and 
to ‘strive to improve those standards.’”  It was argued that the proposed 
law reform legalized systemic violations of worker rights to free 
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and other rights 
acknowledged in the Constitution, International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Conventions ratified by Mexico, and various sections of the NAALC.  
This submission highlights the fact that the proposed reform overlooked 
previous findings by the ILO, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR), and the US and Canadian NAO’s regarding 
existing practices in Mexico that were in violation of international worker 
standards. It was argued in the complaint, that with this bill coming into 
force, not only would new restrictions be imposed on workers, but also 
that this law was legalizing or perpetuating existing practices of violation 
of labor rights, particularly, the lack of public registry of unions and no 
public access to contracts, lack of dispute resolution and denial of union 
registration, exclusion clause or the dismissal of workers for their support 
of a particular union, lack of secret ballots in union elections, the existence 
of union monopolies, and the failure to protect workers’ rights to freedom 
                                                 
45 WOLA was founded in 1974.  Is an organization dedicated to promoting human rights, 
democracy and social and economic justice in Latin America and the Caribbean, and throughout its 
history, WOLA has worked with civil society, organizations and government agents.   At 
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 visited June 22, 2007. 
 
 
26                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 05 
 
from sex discrimination and pregnancy based discrimination. It was 
alleged that the Abascal Project perpetuated practices that had been 
questioned in submissions US 940002, US 9702 and US 9703.   
 
Clearly, this complaint marked a watershed in advocate’s use of 
the NAALC to challenge broad-based labour market and social policy 
issues. That is, the submission directly addressed structural issues 
associated with North American economic integration and pointed to a 
central debate about flexibilization of the labor market in favor of the free 
trade agreement. (Federico Novelo Urdanivia: 2006)  The argument was 
both more complex and challenging to frame than other complaints, as the 
impugned laws had not in fact yet been passed.  It was also closely tied to 
an ongoing labour and social mobilization in Mexico against the proposed 
reforms.   
 
Following the filing of this complaint, a press release and various 
protests were organized by the Mexican Unions and advocates.46  
Although the US press did not show much interest in this case, 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch got involved in both the 
NAALC process and perhaps more importantly, in the political debate 
about the government bill by sending a letter to the Chamber of Deputes 
on February 9 of 2005, where this organization requested the rejection of 
the project, and a new law reform to change the deplorable situation of 
workers in Mexico.  The arguments in the letter followed the same order 
and logic as those of submission US 2005-01.47  Canadian, US 
organizations, and even a US politician, Mary Kaptur, all wrote letters to 
the members of the Mexican Congress requesting the rejection of the 
project.48  Jeffrey Vogt, one of the US lawyers involved in drafting this 
complaint, suggested that a strong “legislative strategy” was a necessary 
part of this action.  This view was echoed by Arturo Alcalde, a leading 
Mexican lawyer in the case who had been involved in several previous 
                                                 
46 La Botz, Dan, “Mexican Labor Year in Review: 2005,” Mexican Labor, News and 
Analysis, January, 2006, Vol. 11, No. 1. 
47 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: Propuesta  a Reformas Laborales de Fox representaria 
duro golpe a los derechos laborales” Carta a la Camara de Diputados de Mexico, 
February 9, 2005, at http://hrw.org/spanish/docs/2005/02/09mexico10158.htm visited 
June 18, 2007. 
48 According to information provided by Arturo Alcalde, and Mexican lawyer, one of the 
leaders of the advocacy group. 




NAALC complaints:  “The legal work could not be done in these actions, 
without the actions of activism; one cannot live without the other.”  In 
Alcalde’s view, legal activism is a notion that involves the complete 
spectrum of socio-legal work, including education, organization and 
litigation.49   
 
Following this approach, the transnational coalition of lawyers in 
association with the labor movement held meetings with members of 
Congress in both Mexico and the US to raise awareness and exercise 
political pressure to halt the approval of the reforms.  The government 
withdrew the project before the NAO issued its decision not to accept the 
complaint.  Although the reasons for the withdrawal were not made 
explicit, advocates credit the mobilization and legal activism on the part of 
the independent labour movement in Mexico, which was supported by the 
efforts of the transnational advocacy network in submitting and 
publicizing the complaint and the issues.    
 
The network which undertook this case was a continuation of prior 
shared work on labour rights defense at both local and international levels.  
In this case, nine lawyers from Mexico and several from the US, several 
with previous experience in NAALC complaints, decided to work together 
toward filing the complaint.  According to Alcalde, lawyers, academics, 
and independent union leaders in Mexico had worked on the issue for over 
a year prior to the creation of the network for this particular purpose.  
Groups allied with independent unions in Mexico had developed an 
alternative legislative proposal to counter the Abascal package, and some 
of that work became the basis for the NAALC complaint.  In discussions 
with the US counterparts, a decision was made to go ahead with filing the 
complaint at the U.S. NAO, though media strategies were coordinated for 
both countries.  While lawyers and union leaders from all three NAALC 
countries worked together throughout the process, the names of the 
Mexican lawyers involved did not appear on the complaint.  Asked about 
the reasons for that, Arturo Alcalde indicated that: “This was not about our 
names or anyone’s names for that matter.  The important thing was the 
                                                 
49 In the words of Arturo Alcalde, the work of a lawyer in this kinds of cases, as it has 
been performed by the Authentic Front of Labor (Frente Autencito del Trabajo) has been 
to defend the rights of the workers through “formacion, organizacion y litigio juridico.”   
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type of complaint; it was about denouncing the brutal violations against 
workers.”    
 
2.  MEXICAN NAO – 2005-1 – RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS UNDER H-2B 
VISA PROGRAM IN IDAHO 
 
In April 2005, the U.S. H-2B Visa program became the subject of a 
public communication filed with the Mexican NAO on behalf of a group 
of migrant workers in Idaho.  The complaint was initiated, drafted and 
filed by the Northwest Workers Justice Center (Attorney Michael Dale) in 
cooperation with Maria Andrade of the Andrade Law Office in Idaho, and 
Laura Abel and other attorneys from the Brennan Center for Justice of 
NYU School of Law.   Important logistical support was provided by the 
AFL-CIO Solidarity office in Mexico City and a total of 9 organizations 
joined the petition.50  Although the complaint was presented on behalf of 
sixteen migrant workers from Panama, Mexico and Guatemala, this was 
intended to at the macro level, affect public policy to cover migrant 
workers under visa H-2B in the federal legal aid system and at the micro 
level of the NAALC, to obtained protection for fundamental, social and 
economic rights of the workers.  The NAO office took over two years to 
respond to the complaint.  Finally, on October 12, 2007, the Mexican 
office sent a letter requesting specific information from the US NAO about 
the ongoing situation of H-2B visa workers.51   
      
The H-2B Visa facilitates the entry of seasonal Mexican workers 
into the United States.  The complaint alleged that migrant workers under 
the H-2B Visa program in Idaho were denied protection against forced 
                                                 
50 These organizations included Centro de Investigacion Laboral y Asesoria 
Sindical, A.C.; Frente Autentico del Trabajo; National Union of Workers (UNT); Red 
Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio; Sin Fronteras, I.A.P.; Idaho Migrant 
Council; National Immigration Law Center; Oregon Law Center; and Pineros y 
Campesinos del Noroeste. 
 
51 Letter sent to the submitters of the complaint by Claudia Anel Valencia Cardona on 
behalf of the Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social Promotion, dated October 24 of 
2007.  Attached to this letter, a copy of the set of 69 thorough questions placed on the US 
Ministry of Labor was also sent.  
    




labour and minimum employment standards; had suffered employment 
discrimination including inequality in pay for women and men; and who 
had been exposed to occupational injuries and offered inadequate 
compensation for these injuries.52  In March 2006, four additional 
Mexicans brought to the United States as temporary workers by an 
American company filed an addendum to the original petition alleging 
employment contract, wage and housing violations during their work in a 
corn packing operation in Olathe, Colorado.53    
 
The issue raised by the petition, as yet untested under the NAALC, 
dealt with the inability of the migrant workers to secure free legal 
assistance to enforce their rights under U.S. labour laws.  In Idaho, legal 
aid lawyers receive federal funding from the Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC) and lawyers receiving LSC funding are barred by federal law from 
representing several categories of immigrants, including those who are in 
the U.S. on H-2B Visas.54  This case tested a specific principle of the 
NAALC, which states in Article 4(d) that the United States must 
 
4.  enforce its laws in connection with NAALC labor principles 
requiring: 
 
d) “[p]roviding migrant workers in [the United States’] territory 
with the same legal protection as [United States] nationals in 
                                                 
52Lawyers working for the following groups filed the complaint: the Northwest Workers' 
Justice Project, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 
and Andrade Law Office.  Sixteen migrant workers from Panama, Mexico and Guatamala 
were joined by nine U.S. and Mexican organizations in filing the complaint, including  
Centro de Investigacion Laboral y Asesoria Sindical, A.C.; Frente Autentico del Trabajo; 
National Union of Workers (UNT); Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio; 
Sin Fronteras, I.A.P.; Idaho Migrant Council; National Immigration Law Center; Oregon 
Law Center; and Pineros y Campesinos del Noroeste. 
53 “Latin American Temporary Workers File Complaint Regarding U.S. Noncompliance 
with International Law Regarding Access to Labor Rights Lawyers”, online: Brennan 
Center 
<http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/immigrant_rights_immigrant_access.html
> (last accessed 17 May 2006). 
54 “Fact Sheet: Complaint to Mexican Government Regarding Access to Labor Rights 
Lawyers for Temporary Workers in the U.S.” (13 April 2005), online: Brennan Center 
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/immigrant%20rights/immigrantrights_latint
empworkers_factsheet.pdf (last accessed 12 December 2005). [“Brennan Center”] 
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respect of working conditions.”55 
  
This case illustrated the difficulty migrant workers have in 
obtaining legal representation in the United States.  This is particularly 
true in remote areas of states such as Idaho, where for a variety of factors 
including language barriers and funding limitations, qualified private legal 
assistance is not readily available.56   Nevertheless, the need for migrant 
workers to have access to proper legal representation is necessary to 
secure a variety of rights related to their status.  Only through the legal 
process can migrant workers in the U.S. obtain a remedy under the federal 
legislation such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act and litigation is much more likely to be successful when 
migrant workers, often unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system and the 
English language, are represented by legal counsel.57  However, as of 
April of 2006 the Idaho state government had not addressed the lack of 
legal representation issue raised by the complaint, nor have any 
modifications been made to state laws to address the issue. 
 
In this case, like the previous one, the filing of the complaint was 
accompanied by an extensive publicity and lobbying strategy both the US 
and Mexico.  Independent unions from Mexico played a key role, 
sponsoring a press conference in that country, while the U.S based lawyers 
also issued a press release.  Since the filing date, advocates have held 
meetings, and continued sharing information and coordinating activities.  
Although the response was quite delayed, advocates consider that the 
initial response of the Mexican NAO was promising.  The sixty nine 
questions attached to the letter review the allegations of the complaint in 
some detail.  Although well aware of the political implications this 
complaint has for both governments, the lawyers interviewed were of the 
view that this complaint had a good chance of proceeding at least to the 
stage of the issuance of a Report.   
 
                                                 
55 “North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the Government of the 
United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
Mexican States” (13 September 1993), online: Commission for Labor Cooperation 
<http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml> (last accessed 30 October 2005). 
(“NAALC”) 
56 Brennan Center, supra note 54. 
57 Ibid. 




Although this case involved a new, rather than an established 
collaboration, the parties involved have built trust, worked together in the 
preparation of the draft and supported each other in understanding the 
legal, cultural and logistic dynamics of the case.  Unlike the previous 
example, these lawyers did not have prior NAALC experience, but they 
did have previous contacts in the U.S. labor movement which facilitated 
the creation of the network.58   
 
Two of the US lawyers59, having identified that the case of these 
particular workers in Idaho had potential to ground a good NAALC 
challenge, then traveled to Mexico City for a week.  This period of testing 
the waters for a potential complaint included a series of eight to ten 
meetings with lawyers and unions.  The lawyers also visited the NAO, to 
meet the staff and learn about the filing process.   During these meetings, 
the lawyers shared their views, heard their counterparts and started the 
learning process, a process that was not always straightforward.  As Dale 
stated “we had to begin by making sense of everything we were talking 
about with our counterparts” not only because of the difference in 
language but also because of the difference in culture and legal principles.  
Indeed, advocates from the two countries had different perspectives on 
some issues.  While for the US lawyers legal representation and minimum 
standards were central to the petition, they found that access to a lawyer 
was a less urgent concern in Mexico.  Rather, border security and 
immigration issues dominated the public policy agenda.  Raising public 
awareness and concern around the poor treatment of legal visa workers 
who had already ‘made it’ into the U.S. was an unanticipated challenge.  
Even though in this case Mexican lawyers participated in discussions of 
the complaint and offered some assistance, the drafting and preparation 
was led by the US advocates.  
 
                                                 
58 The Mexico City office of the AFL-CIO was acknowledged as particularly helpful in 
coordinating meetings with Mexican groups and providing logistical support for public 
outreach efforts such as press conferences. 
59 The lawyers who traveled to Mexico City were Michael Dale and Maria Andrade.  
Maria Andrade had previously represented these clients in a civil lawsuit against the 
employer for damages filed in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho.  All 
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IV.   NORTH AMERICAN LABOUR ADVOCACY AND THE 
NAALC: SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS   
 
Developments associated with deepening economic integration in 
North America have created many negative consequences for workers and 
created new obstacles to the struggle for workers rights.  National 
governments are constrained in their ability to enact or enforce new 
protective legislation, while transnational sites such as the NAALC or the 
ILO are largely ineffectively for protecting or enforcing worker rights.  
There is not yet a comprehensive vision for labour law regulation, 
although it seems clear that what must emerge will incorporate both 
national and transnational actors and institutions. (Trubek, Mosher and 
Rothstein, 2000)     
 
  The ‘transnational’ element of the NAALC has never been its 
most powerful dimension, either normatively or institutionally.  The scope 
and autonomy of the Secretariat of the Commission on Labour 
Cooperation has always been quite constrained, although it did some 
useful work in its first few years.  However, for all practical purposes it 
now appears to have disappeared entirely as an independent entity, having 
been absorbed into the U.S. NAO.  In any event, the functional 
cornerstones of the NAALC have always been the national administrative 
offices, each of which is housed within the labor ministry of its home 
country.  Similarly, the normative purchase of the NAALC rests in the 
enforcement of domestic labour laws.  To the extent that the NAALC is 
deeply embedded within national level norms and institutions, it is more 
accurate to describe the NAALC as a ‘hybrid’ or a ‘tri-national’ rather 
than a fully ‘transnational’ legal institution.   
 
Although there is agreement among lawyers that some actions have 
somewhat benefited workers either directly through the decisions or 
through the collateral civil mobilizations and political pressure, it is also 
agreed that the NAALC is not fulfilling its substantive objectives.  Minor 
advancements have been made in some areas.  For instance, in Mexico it is 
now possible to select Union representatives by secret ballot, which has 
been a big gain for the independent unions.  In many areas, however, small 
gains have been counterbalanced by larger set-backs as the perceived 
demands for greater flexibility in an increasingly competitive global 




environment facilitate the efforts of corporations to lobby largely 
sympathetic governments to erode remaining worker protections. 
      
North American labour advocates, even though they increasingly 
occupy a defensive position, seeking to protect gains made in earlier eras, 
have hardly given up.  In relation to the NAALC, although there have been 
disappointments both with the lack of attention to the process by 
governments and publics and a dearth of favorable results, they continue 
to explore the opportunities it might present.  In this inhospitable context, 
complaints are increasingly located in the context of broader political 
campaigns—what we might say is that the political campaigns themselves 
increasingly have a transnational focus and dimension to them.  In one 
instance, we have lawyers acting on behalf of Mexican migrant workers in 
Idaho seeking to educate and influence the Mexican public around the 
issues faced by workers across the border; during the time of a debate 
between the governments on the nature of a proposed guest worker 
program.  And in another, we have U.S. based lawyers and organizations 
seeking to support mobilization against proposed regressive labour law 
reforms in Mexico by filing a complaint in the Washington NAALC 
office.   
 
Further, these examples of international support and solidarity are 
not easily confined to the ‘judicial’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ arenas.  That is, the 
advocates we spoke with in relation to these two complaints neither 
expected nor required any positive response from the NAO at all—their 
complaints were part of larger strategies involving public education on the 
issues, media, legislative lobbying and mobilization in more than one 
country.  Their purposes had already been served by intervention they 
made into larger public policy debates through the drafting and filing of 
the complaints themselves.  Moreover, it might be suggested that utility of 
the advocacy networks is not limited to the advancement of the NAALC 
claims, but that, insofar as they offer opportunities for ongoing education, 
mobilization and collaboration, they have become themselves a political 
site for social change.   
 
Even this modest development in the direction of a transnational 
labour community is tenuous, however.  The networks depend for their 
ongoing existence on the expertise and energy of a relatively small group 
of committed individuals who identify with the cause of the labor force 
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and have seen the legal world as a vehicle for social justice.  In many 
cases it was personal contacts or experiences that had mobilized these 
individuals to seek out this type of legal advocacy work; for one American 
lawyer, a particularly inspiring course in law school encouraged her to 
look to the international arena for opportunities to extend her advocacy, 
while for one Mexican lawyer, the experience of working in the border 
region mobilized her to advocate for workers rights in her subsequent legal 
career.  Many of the lawyers interviewed observed that one of the best 
parts of the NAALC experience was getting to know and learning from 
their counterparts in another country.  Most observed that, given the right 
sort of case, they would be interested in engaging in this sort of advocacy 
again.  There were some important differences in the situation of the U.S. 
and Mexican lawyers that should be noted.  While the US lawyers were 
funded through legal aid, law school clinical programs or NGO’s, the 
Mexican lawyers in most cases take these cases on with no remuneration.  
The Mexican lawyers also assumed more personal risk associated with 
their advocacy work, including the risk of being intimidated or attacked.   
This last underlines the extraordinary level of commitment that is required 
to create and sustain these lawyering networks.  
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